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Recent Case
EMINENT DOMAIN-ACTS CONSTITUTING THE EXERCISE OF POWERS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN-VALIDITY OF AMORTIZATION OF NONCONFORM-
ING UsEs-Plaintiffs applied for a certificate of occupancy which
would have allowed them to continue to use their lots for the open
storage of lumber, a use which was not in conformance with the
local zoning ordinance. Plaintiffs' use had been in existence forty"
years prior to the enactment of the present zoning ordinance which
allowed for the continuance of all pre-existing nonconforming uses
except that of open storage, which was to have been terminated
within six years after the effective date of the ordinance. The
Supreme Court of Missouri, one justice dissenting,1 held that a lawful
pre-existing nonconforming use is a vested right and the provisions
of this ordinance constitute a taking of private property for public
use wiithout just compensation. Therefore it was not a justifiable
exercise of the police power. Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745
(Mo. 1965).
The U. S. Supreme Court's decision in the Euclid case2 has
been accepted as determinative that zoning which seeks to regulate
the future uses to which land may be put is constitutional so long
as it is not arbitrary or unreasonable and bears a substantial
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.3
Unfortunately the termination of pre-existing nonconforming uses
does not enjoy the status of such decisiveness. The only thing re-
garding this type of termination that can be said to be well
settled is that it cannot be effected immediately.4
From this one point of agreement the decisions seem to diverge
into nearly as many rationales for validity or invalidity as there
are decisions. It cannot be said with any certainty that any par-
1. The dissenting justice felt that this was a valid exercise of police power.
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3. Moore v. City of Lexington, 309 Ky. 671, 218 S.W.2d 7 (Ct. App. 1948); Comer
V. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471, 70 N.W.2d 813 (1955); State v. Coleman 224 P.20i
309 (Nev. 1950).
4. McCaslin v. City of Monterey Park, 163 Cal. App. 2d 339, 329 P.2d 522 (1958)
Stoner McCray Systems v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d 843 (1956)
State v. Thomasson, 378 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1963).
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ticular use,5 amortization period,6 investment in the property 7 or
relation to surrounding area8 will be found to be subject to a valid
exercise of police power. Although there are other courts which
also hold that pre-existing nonconforming uses are constitutionally
protected rights,9 at the other extreme of the continuum are cases
which hold that the owner "holds property subject to a reasonable
exercise of the police power"' 1 and ". . . take it to be well settled
that any business operated in violation or defiance of a zoning
ordinance is to be regarded as a public or common nuisance." ' ,,
Between these extremes lie cases which, deciding the validity issue
either way with the rationales being logical and reasonable as
applied to the facts in each particular case, are completely con-
tradictory in their statements of law. 12 In the midst of this confusion
are two notable expedients to the problem. One is a decision which,
avoiding the controversy between constitutionally protected property
rights and desirable homogenity in urban areas, held an amortiza-
tion provision to be ultra vires. This is based on the concept of
the city as a municipal corporation under the laws of the state. 13
The other is a state statute which specifically permits cities to pass
ordinances by which the city governments may provide reasonable
amortization periods.
4
In view of the wide divergence of decisions in this aspect of
municipal zoning, it is unfortunate that the court in the principal
case chose to characterize nonconforming uses as vested rights.
Stating that as a general rule nonconforming uses are constitutionally
protected rights and citing cases in support thereof' is of little con-
sequence in view of the fact that some courts presume the statute
to be valid or require that it be shown to be unreasonable. 8
Illustrative of the inadvisability of making such conclusive state-
ments are the Dema Realty cases which held a nonconforming use
5. Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs. of Shawnee County, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798
(1957) (auto wrecking yard); contra, Town of Hempstead v. Romano, 33 Misc. 2d 315,
226 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (auto wrecking yard).
6. City of Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541, 342 P.2d 602 (1959) (one year amorti-
zation period) ; contra, City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697
(1953) (one year amortization period).
7. Stoner McCray Systems v. City of Des Moines, supra note 4 ($600 investment
found to create vested right) ; contra, Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212
Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (Ct. App. 1957) (termination at loss of $45,000 annually).
8. City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1948) (use In in-
dustrial zone) ; contra, City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759
(1953) (use in industrial zone).
9. E.g., City of Akron v. Chapman, supra note 6; Des Jardin v. Town of Greenfield,
262 Wis. 43, 53 N.W.2d 784.
10. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929).
11. State ex rel. Dema Realty v. MacDonald, 168 La. 172. 121 So. 613 (1929).
12. See, e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Wilton, 147 Conn. 358, 161 A.2d 185 (1960) (to
be allowed to continue, owner must show unreasonable hardship) ; Holgate v. Zoning Bd.
of Review of the City of Pawtucket, 60 A.2d 732 (R.I. 1948) (right to continue use
cannot be curtailed without compensation).
13. DeMull v. City of Lowell, 368 Mich. 242, 118 N.W.2d 232 (1962).
14. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 § 11-13-1 (Supp. 1964).
15. People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
16. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra note 2: Murphy, Inc. v. Town of
Wilton, supra note 12; Mile Rd. Corp. v. CIty of Boston, 187 N.E.2d 826 (Sup. Jud.
Ct. Mass. 1963).
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to be a nuisance. 1'7 Notwithstanding that these cases have been
discounted as poorly reasoned, 8 they are still good law in their
jurisdiction," and have been cited as authority on the validity of
amortization.2 0 Consequently unnecessarily broad statements of law,
supporting decisions which are reasonable as to their particular
facts, may too often serve as a deterrent or completely preclude
amortization legislation, while in a different factual situation the
statements may preclude an equitable determination on the facts.
Although there is a relatively equal division of the courts as
to validity of amortization, 2 ' a review of the cases will show, not
a confusion of the courts as to constitutional provisions, but, that
they are deciding each case on its particular facts and then
justifying their decisions with unnecessarily broad statements of
law.
22
The participation of the courts in this area obviates any attempts
which might be made through state legislation to provide for
amortization. Therefore it becomes incumbent upon the courts to
recognize that "the policy of zoning embraces the concept of the
ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses ' 23 and that by its very
nature all zoning must take a portion of the landowner's right to
use his land as he pleases. Recognizing the desirability, indeed the
necessity, of segregating some types of land use from others will
leave for the courts to determine only whether the city or the land-
owner more reasonably should bear the cost of amortization. If the
courts uniformly adopt this as their policy on amortization they
will no longer have the need for finding unnecessarily broad con-
stitutional rationales for their decisions and will be able to decide
each case on its merits without fear of being shackled by earlier
unnecessarily broad statements.
ROBERT STROUP
17. Supra notes 10 & 11.
18. Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, supra note 7.
19. State v. Carter, 221 La. 547, 59 So. 2d 831 (1952).
20. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d ?4 (1954).
21. Supra notes 5, 6, 7 & 8.
22. O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 -Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949); State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. MacDonald, supra note 11; Town of Hempstead v. Romano, supra,
note 5.
23. Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
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